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Abstract. We introduce two new variations on the Nash demand
game. One, like all known Nash-like demand games so far, has
the Nash solution outcome as its equilibrium outcome. In the
other, the range of solutions depends on an exogenous breakdown
probability; surprisingly, the Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome proves
to be the most robust equilibrium outcome. While the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution always nishes on top, there is no possible
general ranking among the remaining solution concepts considered;
in fact, the rest of the solution concepts take their turns at the bot-
tom at various bargaining problems, depending on the specics of
the bargaining setup.
1. Introduction
More than half-a-century ago the publication of Nash's paper \Two
Person Cooperative Games" (Nash, 1953) established a new research
agenda, commonly referred to as the Nash program (see Binmore,
1998). It utilizes the strategic (non-cooperative) approach to provide
non-cooperative foundations for cooperative bargaining solution con-
cepts. The prototype is Nash's demand game (Nash, 1953). In it, two
players simultaneously make demands; each player receives the payo
they demand if the demands are jointly feasible, and nothing otherwise.
While the simplicity of Nash's game is its great virtue, it has a ma-
jor downside: every point on the Pareto frontier is a Nash equilibrium
outcome. There have been several attempts to rectify this problem.
The rst attempt was by Nash (1953) himself. He used a \smoothing"
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approach in which incompatible demand combinations did not neces-
sarily lead to zero payos. Although this smoothing attempt uniquely
provided non-cooperative foundations for the Nash solution, it was not
deemed reasonable by game theorists since that time and several alter-
natives have been proposed.
In this paper, we introduce two new variations on the Nash demand
game. The rst is a simultaneous move procedure that yields the Nash
solution as its unique equilibrium outcome. The second is based on
an exogenous breakdown probability. It can have multiple equilibria,
but they always include the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, sometimes
uniquely.
The rst of our demand games is in the tradition of Howard (1992)
and Rubinstein et al. (1992). These papers avoided the multiplicity
of equilibria without resorting to smoothing. The common feature of
these attempts was that they were sequential in nature|they did not
involve simultaneous demands by players any more. Our demand game
shows that a non-smoothing simultaneous version of the Nash demand
game can also lead to the Nash solution outcome uniquely.
Moulin (1984) proposed an alternative procedure where the unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome coincides with that of the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution. However, his setup is very dierent from Nash
demand games. Moulin's procedure has a rst-price auction format
that requires players to bid for the rst-mover advantage.
The existing literature might lead one to think that all variations on
the Nash demand game lead to the Nash solution outcome, and that
other types of procedures, such as the auction framework of Moulin
(1984), are necessary to obtain other outcomes. To think so would
be a mistake. Our second demand game yields the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution.
This demand game takes its inspiration from the Rubinstein et al.
(1992) version of the Nash demand game. Their original feature per-
tains to a player-induced endogenous break-down probability of the
procedure. We instead consider an exogenous break-down probability,
and further we do so in a simultaneous version of the Nash demand
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In our game, two players simultaneously make demand proposals.
Each player receives the payo they demand if the demands are jointly
feasible. Otherwise, the game continues with probability p; thus, it
terminates with probability (1 p), in which case players receive noth-
ing. If the game continues, each player's proposal is selected at random
with equal probabilities. Most importantly, we nd that at the low-
est level of the break-down probability that allows the players to come
to an agreement, there is a unique Nash equilibrium where the play-
ers agree.1 That equilibrium is always the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
outcome (which will sometimes coincide with other solution outcomes).
One may then wonder which solution concept(s) would next follow
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution as we raise the break-down probabil-
ity. We examine this issue for several well-known solution concepts. All
that can be said is that the Equal Sacrice outcome is supported when-
ever the Egalitarian solution is supported. Beyond that, anything goes.
We provide examples in which the (1) Egalitarian and Equal Sacrice,
(2) Average Payo, (3) Nash, and (5) Equal Area solutions rank last.
Thus, while the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is always on top, there is
no possible general ranking among the remaining solution concepts.
Section two sets up the bargaining problem and denes some stan-
dard solutions. Our two Nash demand games are examined in sections
three and four. Some concluding remarks are in section ve.
2. The Bargaining Problem and Solution Concepts
A two-person cooperative bargaining problem is described by a pair
(S;d) where S  R2
+ is the utility possibility set with disagreement point
d 2 S being the utility allocation that results if no agreement is reached.
For notational convenience, let d = (d1;d2) be normalized such that
each di = 0 for each i = 1;2. With d so dened, the bargaining
problem is dened by S alone.
We use the following notation for vector inequalities: x  y means
xi  yi for all i = 1;2; x > y means x  y and there is some i with
xi > yi; x  y means xi > yi for all i. The set S is assumed to contain
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some x  (0;0) and to be convex, compact, and comprehensive. The
last means that if x 2 S and (0;0)  y  x, then y 2 S.
Let B be the set of all such bargaining problems S. A solution is a
function f : B ! R2
+ with fS = (fS
1 ;fS
2 ) 2 S for all S 2 B. Let @S
denote the Pareto frontier (or boundary) of S. Thus @S = fx 2 S :
x0 > x implies x0 62 Sg.
The Nash solution N is dened such that its outcome for S maxi-
mizes N1N2 over the set S (Nash, 1950).
Let bS
i = maxfxi : (x1;x2) 2 Sg. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
KS is dened such that its outcome for S is the maximal point in S
with KS1=KS2 = bS
1=bS
2 (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975).
Let lS be the line through the origin dividing S into equal areas. The
Equal Area solution is dened such that its outcome for S is EA =
lS \ @S (Anbarci and Bigelow, 1994; Anbarci, 1993).
Let mS be the center of gravity of S. The Average Payo solution
AP is dened such that its outcome for S is the intersection of the
line through the origin and mS with the Pareto frontier @S (Anbarci,
1995).
All of the above solution concepts satisfy the axioms of Symmetry,
Weak Pareto Optimality, and Scale Invariance. As a consequence, their
outcomes coincide not only in any symmetric S, but also in any S with
a linear frontier. In that case the outcome for all is the mid-point of
the Pareto frontier.
Two prominent solution concepts fail to satisfy one of the three ax-
ioms mentioned above, the Egalitarian and Equal Sacrice solutions.
Both fail Scale Invariance. The Egalitarian solution E has solution
outcome for S as the point (ES;ES) 2 S that maximizes ES (Kalai,
1977; Roth, 1977). Regardless of how asymmetric S is, ES is always on
the 45o line. Thus given an asymmetric S with a linear Pareto frontier,
its outcome never coincides with any of the solutions above.
The Equal Sacrice solution ES is the other prominent solution
concept that fails to satisfy Scale Invariance. Its outcome for S is
the point (ES1;ES2) that is maximal in S among all points obeying
b1   ES1 = b2   ES2 (Chun, 1988). When the bargaining set is asym-
metric, it never coincides with the solutions satisfying all three axioms.NASH DEMAND GAME AND THE KALAI-SMORODINSKY SOLUTION 5
One more well-known solution concept that fails one of the three
axioms is the Dictatorial solution. There are two Dictatorial solutions,
D(1) and D(2). Their outcomes for S are dened by the equations
DS(i) = bS
i . It fails to satisfy Symmetry, and therefore its outcome
never coincides with any of the other solutions on any S (Bigelow and
Anbarci, 1993).
3. Nash's Demand Game and its Modifications
In Nash's demand game (Nash, 1953), players 1 and 2 simultaneously
make demands xi with xi 2 [0;bi]. If x = (x1;x2) 2 S, player i receives
xi. Otherwise, both players get 0.
The canonical form of this game is a prototype of a very general
problem: how should the gains from cooperation be divided among the
participants? As Binmore (1998) puts it: \Bargaining between two
individuals is worthwhile when an agreement between them can create a
surplus that would otherwise be unavailable.... The archetypal version
of this problem is called dividing the dollar" (p. 21). \Many bargaining
problems have this simple structure. For example, wage negotiations
often reduce to a dispute over how the surplus created by the joint
eorts of a rm and its workers should be divided" (p. 69).
This game, however, has a multiplicity of Nash equilibria since every
point on the Pareto frontier is a Nash equilibrium outcome (as a matter
of fact, (0;0) is also a Nash equilibrium outcome; in that equilibrium
each player i demands bi). There have been several attempts to rectify
this problem.
The use of such a mechanism can be motivated by thinking of an
outside agent, an arbitrator, who tries to help the parties to resolve
their disputes via a mechanism that will induce the parties to reach
a desirable outcome on their own. In the industrial relations litera-
ture, for instance, providing an incentive for the parties to resolve their
dispute voluntarily is considered an important virtue of an arbitration
mechanism (for instance, see Bloom (1981), and the references therein).
In addition, such a mechanism should not be too punitive, unlike the
original Nash demand game.6 NEJAT ANBARCI AND JOHN H. BOYD III
It is evident that Nash's demand game punishes both players se-
verely regardless of how close (x1;x2) is to being in S. Nash (1953) was
the rst to address this problem. He proposed the following variation
of his original demand game: Given (x1;x2), denote player i's payo
function by Li = xiH(x1;x2) where H(x1;x2) = 1 for (x1;x2) 2 S
and H(x1;x2) = 0 otherwise. In order to secure a unique Nash equi-
librium, Nash (1953) suggested smoothing the payo function L by
replacing the indicator function H with a continuous approximation h
such that h equals H on S, but then drops o to zero in a continuous
way. The smoothed payo function for player i is the expected utility
Gi(x1;x2) = xih(x1;x2). Nash (1953) proved that as h approaches H,
the Nash solution outcome becomes the unique Nash equilibrium out-
come of this modied demand game. Remarkably, this holds regardless
of the form of h.
Smoothing, however, has not been received too well by many other
scholars since it lacked motivation. Luce and Raia (1957, p. 142)
called it \a completely articial mathematical escape from the trou-
blesome nonuniqueness," and questioned its \relevance to the players."
Schelling (1960, p. 283) stated that smoothing was \in no sense logi-
cally necessary" in such a prototypical bargaining setup. On the other
hand, with smoothing, players are not necessarily assigned their dis-
agreement payos when the demands are incompatible.
Howard (1992) studied a procedure whose subgame perfect equilib-
rium outcome coincides with that of the Nash solution. This procedure
also assumes common knowledge of preference between players. Let A
be a nite set of alternatives. The players consider lotteries over the
alternatives in A as possible resolutions of the bargaining problem.
Let M be the set of all probability distributions over A. Given a dis-
tribution in M dene the choice (bargaining) set S  R2
+ using von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility ui: M ! R for i = 1;2.
There are three phases in Howard's procedure:
Phase 1: Players 1 and 2 propose (x1;x
2) and (x
1;x2) in S, re-
spectively. If (x1;x2) 2 S, then each player i receives his de-
mand xi. Otherwise, we go to Phase 2.NASH DEMAND GAME AND THE KALAI-SMORODINSKY SOLUTION 7
Phase 2: Player 1 announces some r 2 [0;1]. Player 2 has three
options: (1) He may accept (x1;x
2); (2) he may `counter by
announcing some t 2 (r;1], then Player 1 may choose between
t(x1;x
2) and (x
1;x2); or (3) he may `challenge', then Player 1
may either accept (x
1;x2) or counter by announcing some r0 2
(r;1] so that Player 2 may choose either r0(x
1;x2) or (x1;x
2).
Phase 3: If no agreement is reached in Phase 2, the players get
the disagreement point (0;0).
We propose a new Simultaneous Procedure which retains the rst
phase of Howard's procedure, but replaces the remainder by a simul-
taneous move scheme that rewards more generous proposals:
Phase 1: Players 1 and 2 propose (x1;x
2) and (x
1;x2) in S, re-
spectively. If (x1;x2) 2 S, the players get (x1;x2). Otherwise
we proceed to Phase 2.
Phase 2: Each Player i announces some ti 2 [0;1]. After these
announcements, each Player i may or may not choose tj(xi;x
j).
(1) If Player i chooses tj(xi;x
j) and Player j does not choose
ti(x
i;xj), then tj(xi;x
j) is the outcome.
(2) If both players choose tj(xi;x
j) and ti(x
i;xj) simultane-
ously, a coin toss determines the outcome.
(3) If neither tj(xi;x
j) nor ti(x
i;xj) is chosen, but ti = tj, then
a coin toss determines the outcome.
(4) If neither tj(xi;x
j) nor ti(x
i;xj) is chosen, but ti > tj, then
ti(xi;x
j) becomes the outcome.
If ti > tj, then Player i is more generous in that he is willing to
accept a bigger proportion of his opponent's initial proposal than the
proportion of his initial proposal that his opponent is willing to accept.
That is, at the last part of Phase 2, if there is no agreement, but
Player i is more generous, then he secures the ti proportion of his initial
proposal. Thus, if his generosity is not appreciated by his opponent,
that generosity is applied to his own initial proposal. In a sense, each
player has to be prepared to taste his own medicine, the medicine that
he has prescribed for the other player.8 NEJAT ANBARCI AND JOHN H. BOYD III
Theorem 1. The iterated strict dominance equilibrium outcome of the
Simultaneous Procedure is the Nash solution outcome.
Proof. We know that the highest possible product of the form x1x
2
is the Nash product. Suppose Player 1 proposes the Nash product
(x1;x
2). If Player 2 proposes (x
1;x2) with x2 < x
2, then (x1;x2) 2 S
and becomes the outcome. This is worse for 2 than the Nash outcome.
Thus Player 2 will not respond to the Nash outcome (x1;x
2) with
x2 < x
2. Moreover, if x
1 > x1, x2 < x
2, so Player 2's response will
obey x
1  x1, x2  x
2. Of course, if Player 2 also proposes the Nash
outcome, the procedure ends after Phase 1.
Suppose that the proposals by the two players do not coincide and
that x1x
2 > x
1x2 (we consider the case x1x
2 > x
1x2 later). Since the
proposals do not coincide, 1 > x
2=x2 > x
1=x1  0. In order to secure
t1(x1;x
2) as the outcome, Player 1 must announce some t1 in Phase
2 such that t1 is slightly below x
2=x2 but greater than x
1=x1. To see
that, note that if t1 < x
1=x1, then Player 2 making an announcement
of t2 = 1 at Phase 2 would reject choosing t1(x
1;x2) and would prefer
having t2(x1;x
2) = (x1;x
2) instead. In addition, if t1 is not slightly
below x
2=x2, then Player 2 might choose t1(x
1;x2) which is worse than
t1(x1;x
2) for Player 1.
Likewise, when x1x
2 < x
1x2, in order to secure t2(x
1;x2), Player 2
must announce some t2 in Phase 2 such that t2 is slightly below x
1=x1
but greater than x
2=x2.
When x1x
2 = x
1x2, then observe that each Player i has to announce
a ti = x
1=x1 = x
2=x2. Then in Phase 1, each Player i will propose a
point in S with a higher Nash product than x1x
2 = x
1x2. This bidding
will stop when x1x
2 = x
1x2 is indeed the Nash product. 
Note that the player with a more generous proposal (in the sense that
it complies more with his opponent's demand for himself) gets rewarded
and the one with less generous demand gets relatively punished.
Example 1. Consider the convex hull of f(0;0);(4;0);(0;2)g. The
Nash solution outcome is (2;1). Thus the Nash product is 2. Suppose
Player 1 proposes (2:5;0:75) (with a Nash product of 1:875) and Player
2 proposes (1;1:5) (with a Nash product of 1:5). Note that x
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1=2:5 = 0:4 and x
2=x2 = 0:75=1:5 = 0:5. Then Player 1 can announce
some t1 = 0:5    where  is a small and positive with  < 0:1. Then
t1 = 0:5    > 0:4 = x
1=x1. In that case, Player 1 will not choose any
t2(x1;x
2) since his t1 will be greater than Player 2's t2 and Player 1
prefers t1(x1;x
2) = (0:5   )(2:5;0:75) = (1:25;0:375)   (2:5;0:75) to
any such t2(x1;x
2)  0:4(2:5;0:75) = (1;0:3). In order to have a higher
payo than 0:375, Player 2 has to make a proposal with a higher Nash
product than (2:5;0:75) back in Phase 1, and so on.
4. Probabilistic Demand Games
Rubinstein et al. (1992) simplied Howard's procedure by introduc-
ing a probability of terminating the game.
Phase 1: Player 1 proposes (x1;x
2) 2 S.
Phase 2: Player 2 can either accept Player 1's proposal or pro-
poses (x
1;x2) 2 S and announces some p 2 [0;1].
Phase 3: Nature makes a choice: With probability (1   p) the
game terminates with payos d = (0;0) and with probability p
the game continues.
Phase 4: Player 1 chooses between Player 2's proposal (x
1;x2)
and a lottery that yields 1's original proposal (x1;x
2) with prob-
ability p and d = (0;0) with probability (1   p).
This procedure also yields a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
which coincides with that of the Nash solution. The presence of Na-
ture's choice in that procedure is very appealing. It points out the pos-
sibility that a relationship may end after a failure to reach an agreement
with some probability. But the fact that this probability is determined
by one of the players may not be deemed very realistic.
Instead, we consider a very simple but simultaneous version of the
Rubinstein et al. (1992) procedure where the probability with which
the relationship may end after a failure to reach agreement will be
exogenous and may take any value in [0;1].
Dene the Probabilistic Simultaneous Procedure as follows:
Phase 1: Players 1 and 2 respectively propose (x1;x
2) and (x
1;x2)
in S. If (x1;x2) 2 S, then each Player i receives his demand10 NEJAT ANBARCI AND JOHN H. BOYD III
xi. Otherwise, the game continues to Phase 2 with probabil-
ity p 2 [0;1] and terminates paying d = (0;0) with probability
(1   p).
Phase 2: One of the initial proposals (x1;x
2) and (x
1;x2) is se-
lected at random with probability 1
2.
Apart from the original Nash demand game (which ends up with
a continuum of Nash equilibria), this is one of the simplest demand
games that has been studied in the literature|if not the simplest.
An interesting question is whether this procedure provides any non-
cooperative foundations for the Nash or any other bargaining solution
concept.
It is easy to see that, when p = 0, our scheme reduces to the original
Nash demand game. As p tends to 1, it in a sense resembles the con-
ventional arbitration with chilling eect where parties make extreme
demands and the arbitrator splits the dierence. The interesting cases
will certainly lie between these two extremes where p is neither close
to 0 nor to 1.
One question is whether any bargaining solution outcomes would be
admitted in the Nash equilibrium set of our scheme given all or most p
levels. We can readily infer that the p = 0 case would admit all known
solution outcomes (including the Dictatorial solution outcomes). But
when we consider the p = 1 case, a simple setup with a linear Pareto
frontier will lead to the midpoint becoming the only Nash equilibrium
outcome. From that one can infer that only bargaining solutions satis-
fying Symmetry, Weak Pareto Optimality, and Scale Invariance would
be initial candidates, precluding the outcomes from other well-known
solution concepts, including the Egalitarian, Equal Sacrice, and Dic-
tatorial solutions, from being in every Nash equilibrium outcome set.
In addition, the equilibrium outcome obtained in the simple setup
with a linear Pareto frontier has a drawback too. The demands are
far from the equilibrium outcome payos. Then we pose the follow-
ing question: are there any Nash equilibria for some levels of p, where
the demands coincide with some of the resulting Nash equilibrium out-
come payos such that the demand vector also coincides with one of
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solution outcomes would be admitted in the Nash equilibrium set with
the above property (where the demand vector coincides with the equi-
librium payos) at some levels of p?
If there are several such solution concepts, then the crucial question
becomes which of these solution concepts' outcome will be the Nash
equilibrium outcome with that property at the highest possible p level
(i.e., with the least amount of possible punishment via the probabilistic
imposition of the disagreement outcome). Thus one can imagine a
procedure similar to the Dutch auction (or another procedure similar
to the English auction) where one starts with p = 1 (or p = 0) and
keeps decreasing (increasing) p until one solution outcome becomes the
unique equilibrium outcome (until only one solution outcome remains
as the equilibrium outcome) where the demand vector coincides with
the equilibrium payo vector.
Another way of approaching this scheme would be to consider the fol-
lowing setup. Suppose one segment in a society strictly adheres to one
of the solution concepts as the norm (see Binmore, 1998, for instance)
and always demands the payo that is prescribed by that solution con-
cept for him in any bargaining situation. Suppose another segment
in that society does not adhere to that norm. Consider bargaining
situations between members of dierent segments. Then one can nd
the lowest probability of assigning the disagreement payo to induce a
member from the second segment as well to demand the payo that is
prescribed by that solution concept for him. That would be the norm
that can be sustained most easily.
Theorem 2. In the Probabilistic Simultaneous Procedure, there is a
maximum probability p for which there is a Nash equilibrium that both
players agree on (i.e., the game does not go to Phase 2). The Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution outcome is a Nash equilibrium at p and at every
lower value of p. Moreover, if the probability of continuing to Phase
2 is p, and (x1;x2) is a Nash equilibrium that both players agree on,
then (x1;x2) = (KS1;KS2). Finally, p  2=3.
Proof. As before, let bi = maxfxi : (x1;x2) 2 Sg. We start by suppos-
ing that Player j has oered x
i to Player i. Player i can either accept,12 NEJAT ANBARCI AND JOHN H. BOYD III
or choose (x1;x2) 2 S with xi 6= x
i. In the latter case we go to Phase 2,
and Player i obtains a payo of (p=2)xi + (p=2)x
i. Player i will prefer
to go to Phase 2 if
p
2
xi +
p
2
x

i > x

i; that is, if
p
2
xi >

1  
p
2

x

i:
If Player i prefers to go to Phase 2, his best response is to pick his
ideal point, which pays him bi. Thus Player i prefers to go to Phase 2
whenever (p=2)bi > (1   (p=2))x
i. We simplify this to pbi > (2   p)x
i
Let (KS1;KS2) be the Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome. We know that
KS1=b1 = KS2=b2. For (KS1;KS2) to be a Nash equilibrium where
both players choose the same point, we must have pbi  (2   p)KSi.
Dene p by pbi = (2   p)KSi). If (KS1;KS2) = (b1;b2), p = 1.
Otherwise, p < 1. Moreover, if p  p, pbi  ppbi = (2   p)KSi 
(2   p)KSi. It follows that (KS1;KS2) is a Nash equilibrium for all
p  p.
Now suppose p < 1. If (x1;x2) is a Nash equilibrium for p with both
players choosing the same point, then
bi 

2   p
p

xi <

2   p
p

xi; so xi > KSi:
But (KS1;KS2) is weakly Pareto optimal, so this is impossible. There
are no such Nash equilibria. It follows that if there is a Nash equi-
librium that both players agree on, then p  p. But then the Kalai-
Smorodinsky outcome is also a Nash equilibrium.
Now suppose (x1;x2) is a Nash equilibrium that both players agree on
with a continuation probability of p. Then xi  pbi=(2   p) = KSi.
We cannot have both xi > KSi as the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is
weakly Pareto optimal. Choose i so xi > KSi and let j denote the other
player. Then we may take a convex combination of (x1;x2) and j's ideal
point that leads to a strong Pareto improvement over (KS1;KS2). This
is impossible, so (KS1;KS2) is the only Nash equilibrium that both
players agree on when p is the continuation probability.
The Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome gives each player at least half of
the ideal point. The minimum value of p occurs when each gets ex-
actly half of the ideal value, as occurs when S is the convex hull ofNASH DEMAND GAME AND THE KALAI-SMORODINSKY SOLUTION 13
f(0;0);(b1;0);(0;b2)g. Then bi = pbi=(2 p), which implies p = 2=3
is the minimum value. 
A natural question is whether the various bargaining solution out-
comes appear in a predictable order when p decreases. The next theo-
rem addresses one such case.
Theorem 3. Suppose the Egalitarian solution outcome is a Phase 1
Nash equilibrium of the Probabilistic Simultaneous Procedure at prob-
ability p. Then the Equal Sacrice outcome is also a Phase 1 Nash
equilibrium at probability p.
Proof. Let S be the bargaining set and b = (b1;b2) the ideal point corre-
sponding to S. Because S is comprehensive, we know (b1;0);(0;b2) 2 S.
Let (z;z) 2 S be the Egalitarian outcome. Without loss of generality,
we may assume b1  b2. In fact, if b1 = b2, we must have b1 = b2 = z,
in which case (z;z) is also the Equal Sacrice outcome.
For the remainder of the proof we consider the non-trivial case b1 >
b2. Let T be the convex hull of f(0;0);(b1;0);(z;z);(0;b2)g. Let x =
(x1;x2) be the Equal Sacrice outcome for T. The Equal Sacrice
outcome for S is to the northeast of x, and so will be an equilibrium
at any value of p where x is an equilibrium. Thus it is enough to show
the result for T.
The line through (z;z) and (b1;0) is y = z(b1   x)=(b1   z). The
Equal Sacrice outcome obeys x2 = zb2=b1. Equal Sacrice then yields
x1 = b1   b2 + x2 = b1 + b2(z   b1)=b1. Now x1  b1, so (b1   b2)x1 
(b1   b2)b1 = (x1   x2)b1. It follows that x2b1  x1b2.
Since the Egalitarian outcome is an equilibrium, z  bip=(2   p) for
i = 1;2. As b1 > b2, we can sum this up as z  b1p=(2   p). But then
x2 = zb2=b1  b2p=(2   p). We use the fact that x1  x2(b1=b2) to see
that x1  b1p=(2 p). This establishes that Equal Sacrice outcome x
is an equilibrium at probability p. 
What about the other cases? Can we rank other solution concepts
using the probability level they appear at? No!
The following examples show that the no other unambiguous rank-
ings are possible for the other solutions. Denote the solution outcomes14 NEJAT ANBARCI AND JOHN H. BOYD III
as follows: Nash (N), Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS), Egalitarian (E), Equal
Sacrice (ES), Equal Area (EA), and Average Payo (AP). Sometimes
all of these will coincide, as happens when S is the convex hull of
f(0;0);(2;0);(0;2)g. Note that p = 2=3 here.
Example 2. Let S be the convex hull of f(0;0);(0;2);(4;0)g. Then
the Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky, Equal Area, and Average Payo solu-
tion outcomes coincide at (2;1). Egalitarian is (4=3;4=3) and Equal
Sacrice is (8=3;2=3). Here p = 2=3, which supports the Kalai-
Smorodinsky, Nash, Equal Area, and Average Payo solution out-
comes. The Equal Sacrice and Egalitarian solution outcomes do not
appear as equilibria until p  1=2. Of course, if we had taken (2;0) as
the right corner of S, all of these solution outcomes would coincide at
(1;1).
Example 3. We modify the previous example slightly by truncat-
ing at x1 = 3. In other words, we take S as the convex hull of
f(0;0);(0;2);(3;1=2);(3;0)g. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution outcome
is now (12=7;8=7) with p = 8=11. Then Nash solution outcome re-
mains at (2;1) with p = 2=3. The Equal Area solution outcome is
now (15=8;17=16) with p = 34=49. The Egalitarian solution outcome
remains at (4=3;4=3), but now has p = 8=13. Equal Sacrice joins the
Nash solution outcome at (2;1) with p = 2=3. The Average Payo
solution outcome is (24=13;14=13) with p = 14=23.
Example 4. We now truncate at x1 = 2. In other words, we take S as
the convex hull of f(0;0);(0;2);(2;1);(2;0)g. The Kalai-Smorodinsky,
Egalitarian, and Equal Sacrice solution outcomes are now (4=3;4=3)
with p = 4=5. Then Nash solution outcome remains at (2;1) with
p = 2=3. The Equal Area solution outcome is now (3=2;5=4) with
p = 2=5. The Average Payo solution outcome is (16=11;14=11) with
p = 4=19.
Example 5. Let S be the convex hull of f(0;0);(3;0);(3;1);(2;2);(0;3)g.
The point (2;2) is the Kalai-Smorodinsky, Nash, Equal Sacri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Egalitarian solution outcome. However, the Equal Area solution out-
come is (17=8;15=8). This requires p  10=13. The Average Payo
solution outcome is (40=19;36=19), which is supported by p  24=31.
We can sum up the rankings by probability of the various solutions.
Example 2 Example 3 Example 4 Example 5
KS, N, AP, EA KS KS, ES, E KS, N, ES, E
ES, E EA AP AP
ES, N EA EA
E N
AP
As we know, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution outcome is always at
the top. We see that each of the other solutions sometimes ties it.
These also examples show that any of the solutions other than Kalai-
Smorodinsky can be last in the rankings, although when Equal Sacrice
is last, it must tie with Egalitarian. Example 3 shows that Egalitarian
can rank strictly below Equal Sacrice. In sum, the examples show
that no other general rankings of these solutions are possible beyond
the requirements of Theorems 2 and 3.
5. Concluding Remarks
We have introduced two variations on the Nash demand game that
involve simultaneous moves. The rst is a simultaneous game related
to Howard's procedure. As in most Nash demand games, the Nash so-
lution outcome is the equilibrium outcome. The second has a range of
possible solutions that depends on an exogenous breakdown probabil-
ity. Of these, the Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome is most robust equilib-
rium outcome. The breakdown probabilities at which other solutions
occur allow us to rank the other outcomes. We show there is no possi-
ble general ranking among a variety of standard solution concepts, save
that the Equal Sacrice solution is more robust than the Egalitarian
solution.
Whether there are other simple Nash demand games that yield some
of the other well-known bargaining solutions remains an open question.16 NEJAT ANBARCI AND JOHN H. BOYD III
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